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Article 6

Liability in Mass Immunization Programs
Nina S. Appel*
In January and February of 1976, army personnel at Fort
Dix, New Jersey, became ill with flu-like symptoms. When studies showed a viral infection similar to the one responsible for the
1918-1919 Swine Flu pandemic, President Ford (and others)
urged the appropriation of emergency funds for a nationwide influenza immunization program.' Congress hurriedly appropriated $135,064,000,' but problems developed almost immediately.
One of the four manufacturers3 of the vaccine produced the
wrong strain, and distribution was delayed. All four manufacturers raised liability insurance concerns and were unwilling to provide any vaccine without adequate insurance coverage.' Concern
arose that the mass-immunization program would not begin
before the influenza season.

A. The Congressional Response
President Ford's active involvement as well as the publicity
associated with the mysterious outbreak of Legionnaires' Disease
in Philadelphia in July 1976, may have provided the needed
stimulus for congressional action. The Swine Flu Act-rovided
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law
in Chicago. J.D., 1959, Columbia University.
1. Several excellent articles deal with the Swine Flu Program of 1976, including
Baynes, Liability for Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations and Some
Reflections on the Swine Flu Experience, 21 ST. LOUISU.L.J. 44 (1977); Franklin &
Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from the Polio and Flu
Episodes, 65 CALIF.L. REV.754 (1977); Note, Apportioning Liability in Mass InocuEations: A Comparison of Two Views and a Look at the Future, 6 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC.
CHANGE
239 (1977); Note, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manufacturers' Liability for
Failure to Warn, 29 VAND.L. REV.235 (1976).
2. Act of April 15, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-266, 90 Stat. 363 (1976).
3. The four manufacturers were Merrill-National Laboratories; Merck Sharpe &
Dohrne; Parke, Davis & Co.; and Wyeth Laboratories. See Swine Flu Claims Pile U p in
WEEK,
January 24, 1977, at 23-24.
Washington, BUSINESS
4. See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1976, a t 9, col. 6; 122 CONG.REC.26,634 (1976).
5. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976,42 U.S.C. 5 247bG)-(1) (1976).
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the necessary assurance to the drug manufacturers by making
lawsuits against the government the exclusive remedy for all actions connected with the Swine Flu program. The Act was
passed precipitously,6 but not without concern that it could create an undesirable precedent.' The United States accepted liability "for personal injury or death arising out of the administration of swine flu vaccine under the swine flu program and based
upon the act or omission of a program participant in the same
manner and to the same extent as the United States would be
liable in any other action brought against it under [the Federal
Tort Claims Act]?
Although the government cannot be held strictly liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act: the flu statute contained an
exception: the liability of the United States could "be based on
any theory of liability that would govern an action against such
program participant under the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred, including negligence, strict liability in tort,
and breach of warranty."1° "Program participant" was to mean
the manufacturer or distributor of the vaccine, and the public or
private agencies, organizations, and medical personnel who provided swine flu inoculations without charge and in compliance
with the informed consent form and procedures." The government also agreed not to invoke the "discretionary" act exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act? Furthermore, if the swine .
flu action was brought within two years of the date of inoculation and was dismissed for failure to file an administrative claim,
a plaintiff was given the longer of thirty days after dismissal or
two years from the date the claim arose to file an administrative
claim.lS The remedy against the United States was exclusive,14
6. Indeed, one commentator has pointed out that the bill as stated in the Congressional Record is not the bill as stated in the United States Code Congressional and
Administrative News. Congress may not have known what was actually being enacted.
See Note, Apportioning Liability in Mass Inoculations: A Comparison of Two Views
and a Look at the Future, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.CHANGE
239, 259 n.128.
7. See 122 CONG.REC.26,627 (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. 5 247b(k)(2)(A) (1976).
9. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
10. 42 U.S.C. 5 247b(k)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
11. Id. 5 247b(k)(2)(B).
12. Id. 5 247b(k)(2)(A)(ii).
13. Id. $ 247b(k)(2)(A)(iii). See, e.g., Low v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.
Va. 1978) (administrative remedies must be exhausted in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 8
2675 (1976)).
14. 42 U.S.C. 5 247b(k)(3) (1976).
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and the case was to be tried without a jury as under the Federal
Tort Claims Act? Notwithstanding any provision of state law,
the United States was entitled to indemnity against any program participant whose failure to carry out a contract with the
government or whose negligence caused the injury."
A key concern addressed in the Act was the development of
"a written informed consent form" with accompanying procedures, to assure that the risks and benefits from the swine flu
vaccine were fully explained to each individual to whom the vaccine was to be administered?' The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), in consultation with the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, was directed to draft and implement this form.18 Notably, the consent form that was developed
did not specifically warn of the possibility of contracting Guil1ainBarre disease, a neurological disorder.'@After describing the
influenza and the vaccine, the form included a paragraph entitled "Special Precautions," which stated: "as with any vaccine or
drug, the possibility of a severe or potentially fatal reaction exists. However, the flu vaccine has rarely been associated with severe or fatal reactions." The vaccinee, or his guardian, signed in
two places to afErm that he had read the statement about swine
flu and the special precaution. A second form indicating that legal remedies were available against the United States Government was also distributed.1°
The Act required the Attorney General to defend all claims
arising out of the swine flu program against federal government
employees or program participants and their insurers." Upon
certification of the Attorney General, the United States was to
be substituted as party defendant and the action removed to the
appropriate federal district court." However, a program particiId. fj 247b(k)(5)(A);28 U.S.C. 8 2402 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(7) (1976).
Id. § 247bCj)(l)(F).
Id.
Guillain-Barre is a neurological syndrome marked by burning or tingling limbs,
muscular weakness, and sometimes paralysis or even death. See STEDMEN'S
MEDICAL
DICTIONARY
1383 (23d ed. 1976).
20. This form, entitled "Important Information from the U S . Public Health Service
about Swine Flu and Victoria Flu Vaccines," referred the vaccinee to the U.S. Public
Health Services Claims Office in Rockville, Md., for further information.
21. 42 U.S.C. 8 247b(k)(4) (1976).
22. Id. § 247b(k)(5)(A)-(B).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
general
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pant could lose its protected status if it failed to cooperate with
the government in processing or defending a claim. If this occurred, the court was required to substitute that party as defendant in place of the United States, and upon motion, remand
any such suit to the court in which it was instituted.13 Of course,
status as a program participant required that the public or private agency or health personnel provide the inoculation without
charge and in compliance with the informed consent
pr~cedures.~'
B. The Guillain-Barre Litigation
Public concern about the safety of the vaccine and skepticism of the need for the program plagued the mass immunization efforts. After reports of suspected association between the
swine flu vaccine and Guillian-Barre syndrome, the program was
halted in December 1976. Under the provisions of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, as incorporated in the Swine Flu Act, a claim
had to be filed within two years after accrual.26 For nearly all
claimants the accrual date would be the date of inoculation or
shortly thereafter; hence, the filing deadline for most claimants
would have been within a short period after December 1978.16
As of December 1979 a total of 912 suits had been filed
against the United States for $1,150,000,000 in damages." Of
these suits, 814 have been consolidated for pretrial procedure in
. ~ ~ hundred and ninety-four of the
the District of C o l ~ m b i aFour
claimants allege Guillian-Barre syndrome, 121 allege other neurological disorders, and 252 claim nonneurological disorders.
Forty-five deaths are alleged to have occurred as a result of
Guillian-Barre. As of December 1, 1979, 3,813 administrative
claims had been filed for a total of $3,417,000,000 in damages. Of
these claims, 118 have been paid (settlements totalled $3.7 million), 1,580 have been denied, and 102 have been closed (withdrawn or abandoned by the claimant).'@
23. Id. § 247b(k)(6).
24. Id. 5 247b(k)(2)(B).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
26. The program was resumed in February 1977 on a limited basis following an outbreak of A-Victoria flu in Florida.
27. Statistics obtained in a telephone conversation with Ms. Janice McLeod, paralegal specialist, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Torts Branch (December 4, 1979).
28. Id. See In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litigation, 446 F. Supp. 244
(J.P.M.D.L. 1978).
29. Information supplied by Ms. McLeod, supra note 27. The statistics are not pub-
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On June 16, 1978, HEW Secretary Califano announced that
claimants for federal compensation would "not need to prove
negligence by Federal workers or others in the Swine Flu program as required by Federal law and the law in many state~.'''~
Most claimants could therefore recover by showing that they developed Guillain-Barre as a result of the vaccination and that
they consequently suffered the alleged damages. The Secretary
adopted the policy for two related reasons. The first was that
the consent form had neither warned individuals that there was
a "one in one hundred thousand" risk that a person would contract Guillain-Barre, nor that "one in every two million" would
die from the condition." The second was that the federal government, in an unprecedented effort, had actively urged Americans to be vaccinated." The Secretary emphasized, however,
that this policy did not apply to any non-Guillain-Barre cases
arising under the swine flu program, or to claims arising under
any other government sponsored*or supported immunization

C. Scope of Government and Manufacturer Liability
To date, constitutional attacks on the Swine Flu Act have
been made in four reported cases? The statute has been attacked as being violative of due process, equal protection of the
laws, the seventh amendment right to trial by jury, and the
tenth amendment reservation of power to the states. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of the Act has been upheld in all the
cases.
Before enactment of the federal liability legislation, some
states, led by California, had adopted legislation exempting participants (licensed health professionals or facilities) from liabillished but are available upon request.
30. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, HEW News 2 (June 20, 1978).
31. The Secretary observed that the lack of warning was probably defensible as a
matter of law, since there was no evidence linking flu vaccinations to Guillain-Barre
when the form was developed. Id. a t 3.
32. Id. a t 4.
33. Id. a t 2.
34. See Ducharme v. Merrill-Nat'l Laboratories, Inc., 574 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978); Jones v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 35 (W.D.
Ark.), a f d , 583 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1978); Wolfe v. Merrill-Nat'l Laboratories, Inc., 433
F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Tenn. 1977); Sparks v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411
(W.D.
Okla. 1977).
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ity unless their behavior involved "willful m i s c o n d ~ c t . "In
~ ~a recent swine flu case, the California statute was upheld despite
claims that it involved special legislation, fostered economic discrimination, and violated the supremacy clause.36When the federal legislation assumed its present form, the federal government
was to be liable only if a private person "would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred."s7 Therefore, in states like California,
those injured by negligence during the administration of the
program may receive no compensation.
Claims brought directly against the vaccine's manufacturers
have been similarly unavailing. An argument made in such efforts to sue the manufacturers directly is that the signing of an
informed consent form is a sine qua non of the Act's operation.
This, however, is troublesome in view of the fact that an estimated 13% of those vaccinated may never have signed any
form." In a recent case,le the plaintiff, a doctor who had inoculated herself without signing the form, argued that because she
had not signed the form her case fell outside the scope of the
Act. The court refused to hold that drug manufacturers were required to comply with the informed consent procedures before
they could be considered program participants. In dictum, however, the court stated that it was "arguable" that program participant status might not be conferred on an inoculating agency
or other health personnel absent such c o m p l i a n ~ e . ~ ~
35. See CAL.GOV'TCODE§ 856.6 (West Supp. 1979); MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 112,

4 12C (West 1971); N.Y. PUB.HEALTHLAW$ 329 (McKinney 1971); 42 PA. CONS.STAT.
ANN.3 8334 (Purdon 1978);R.I. GEN.LAWS 23-8-2 (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE$ 44-29-210
(Supp. 1979).
36. Heitz v. County of Sacramento, 87 Cal. App. 3d 754, 151 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1978).
37. 28 U.S.C. $ 1346(b) (1976).
38. Note, Apportioning Liability in Mass Inoculations: A Comparison of Two
239, 253 n.85 (citing
Views and a Look at the Future, 6 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC.CHANGE
N.Y. Post, Dec. 18, 1976, at 3, col. 2 (final ed.)).
39. Wolfe v. Merrill Nat'l Laboratories, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
40. Similar questions of program participant status could be raised if the vaccine
had been sold, or if the program participant otherwise refused to cooperate with the
government. Suppose, for example, that a negligent, insolvent doctor were to injure a
vaccinee in a jurisdiction that did not exonerate program participants for negligence. If
the doctor cooperated with the government, the Act's provisions would substitute the
government as a defendant and presumably the plaintiff could recover. The government
would then bear the risk of the doctor's insolvency in an indemnity claim. Could the
same doctor, merely by refusing to cooperate with the government, force the plaintiff to
sue him personally in a state court? This was surely not the intention of the Act, and
equitable considerations might dissuade the government from so acting were the situation to arise.
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The full range of injuries to be compensated under the provisions of the Act remains undetermined. The language used by
Congress is very broad, referring as it does to "personal injury or
death arising out of the administration of swine flu vaccine
under the swine flu program and based upon the act or omission
The Act further provides that "liaof a program parti~ipant."~~
bility" may be based on any theory "that would govern an action
against such program participant under the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred, including negligence, strict
liability in tort, and breach of ~arranty.'"~Injuries resulting
from negligently broken or unsterilized injectors, or from negligently administered inoculations, would certainly be covered in
those jurisdictions where negligence is actionable, but other situations are less certain. For example, a pending case4' alleges that
the plaintiff fainted while leaving the building in which she had
received a swine flu vaccination. Her fall resulted in several
chipped teeth. If she merely tripped over a step, or had fallen on
her way into the building, her injury could arguably fit within
the broad language of the Act. Another injury arguably within
the scope of the Act is negligently inflicted emotional distress.
Many jurisdictions recognize the tort, especially where the requisite "impact" has been alleged. The inoculation itself would
surely be sufficient impact.

During the Senate debate on the proposed swine flu legislation, many were made uneasy by the fact that the insurance
companies viewed the risks of the program as being too great to
insure against." A brief review of recent cases involving the liability of drug manufacturers in regard to ethical drugs suggests
that the concern was not unfounded.

A. Drug Liability and the Duty to Warn
A claimant in any product liability action usually has a
41. 42 U.S.C. 5 247b(k)(2)(A) (1976).
42. Id. 5 247b(k)(2)(A)(i).
43. Childress v. United States, No. 1-77-313 (E.D. Tenn., transferred to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab.
Litigation, 453 F. Supp. 648 (J.P.M.D.L.1978)).
44. 122 CONG.REC.26,628 (1976) (Senator Taft referred to "only . . . two settlements of law suits arising out of neglect in the production of vaccine in the past 7 years
. . . and only . . . 16 cases since 1920.").
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choice of several legal theories. Depending on the law of the jurisdiction and on the facts of the case, a plaintiff may proceed
on theories of negligence, breach of warranty (implied or express), strict liability in tort, or misrepresentation. Obviously,
practical considerations regarding evidentiary matters, the relevant statute of limitations, available defenses, and the availability of punitive damages, may well make one theory preferable to
another. But often, the pleadings are couched in the alternative.
The claimant with a drug related injury is no different from
other plaintiffs in that he must allege one of the above legal theories in order to be heard and must establish the elements of his
case in order to prevail. To date, the concept of no-fault recovery for drug-induced injuries urged by several legal scholars,
particularly in mass immunization cases:= has been resisted in
this country. The courts have also been unwilling to hold manufacturers "absolutely liable," rejecting the theory that the production of drugs is an ultrahazardous activity."
The ethical-drug manufacturer has a duty to test and develop the drug properly,47to comply with all government regulat i o n ~ : ~to keep abreast of developments in regard to the drug:@
and to warn of side effects-a troublesome responsibility in recent years.
In the case of prescription drugs, a warning to the doctor is
ordinarily held to satisfy the manufacturer's duty.60For a breach
45. See generally Baynes, supra note 1; Franklin & Mais, supra note 1, a t 773; McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U . CHI. L. REV. 3 (1970);
O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L.
REV.749 (1973).
46. See Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 47-48, 588 P.2d 326, 341-42 (1978) (refusing
to impose absolute liability on the manufacturer of an investigational drug); McCreery v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 86, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 736 (1978).
47. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
48. Government regulations are beyond the scope of this paper. See generally
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974); Rheingold,
The MERl29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF.L.
REV.116 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d
286 (8th Cir. 1967); Mahr v. G. D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 390 N.E.2d 1214
(1979); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967).
50. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Love v. Wolf, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 42 (1967); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322
(1963); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 418, 307 A.2d 440
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of that duty, the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient?
It has been said that the manufacturer's compliance with this
duty enables the prescribing physician, the "learned intermedito balance
ary between the purchaser and the manufa~turer,"~
the risk of possible harm against the benefits to be gained by the
patient's use of the drug." The rationale is that if the doctor is
properly warned "there is an excellent chance that injury to the
patient can be avoided. This is particularly true if the injury
takes place slowly . . ."" The duty to warn the medical profession is not measured in all cases by quantitative standards. In
some circumstances, the manufacturer may have a duty to warn
those few persons it knows will be injured by the drug's side eff e c t ~Furthermore,
.~~
the warning has to be brought home to the
doctorm undiluted by overpromotion of the drug.67
A further controversial and unresolved question is whether
a drug manufacturer may be held liable for failure to warn of
unforeseeable risks, or whether its liability for failure to warn is
limited to those risks which it knows or has reason to know are
inherent in the use of its drug." In a recent case, Hamilton u.
Hardy," the two theories were distinguished by the Colorado
Court of Appeals. Finding error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on strict liability for the defendant doctor's failure to warn concerning the dangers of Ovulen, the court remarked that "the evidence which proves a failure to warn is the

.

-

-

(1973).
51. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974).
52. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d at 85.
53. See, e.g., McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. at 387, 528 P.2d at
529.
54. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d a t 85.
55. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d at 430; Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish, 370 F.2d a t 85.
56. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18
L. REV.947, 993 (1964); Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th
RUTGERS
Cir. 1979); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
57. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke-Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); Stevens v.
Parke-Davis & Co., 9 Cai. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Love v. Wolf,
249 Cal. App. 2d 882, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 291, 282
A.2d 206, 220 (1971).
58. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d at 426; Parke-Davis & Co. v.
Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969); Mahr v. G. D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d at
560, 390 N.E.2d at 1220; Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 353, 374
N.E.2d 683,686 (1978); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. at 386,528 P.2d
at 530.
59. 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976).
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same under both t h e o r i e ~ , "but
~ ~ refused to find the theories
identical.
Under strict liability, the test is whether the failure of Searle
to adequately warn of the potentially dangerous propensities of
its product rendered that product unreasonably dangerous. It
is of no import whether the drug manufacturer's warning comported with the warning a reasonably prudeht drug manufacturer would have given. "[Sltrict tort liability shifts the focus
from the conduct of the manufacturer to the nature of the

The court proposed the following test to determine whether the
evidence submitted warranted a finding for the plaintiff:
"A way to determine the dangerousness of the article, as distinguished from the seller's culpability, is to assume the seller
knew of the product's propensity to injure as it did, and then
to ask whether, with such knowledge, he would have been [acting unreasonably] in selling it without a warning."82

The opposing view was articulated clearly by the Michigan
Supreme Court in the recent case of Smith v. E. R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc." The plaintiffs deceased wife suffered a rare anaphylactic reaction when the defendant's product, Renografin-60, was
injected into her blood stream. Breach of implied warranty and
negligence were pleaded, but the trial court refused to instruct
the jury regarding the warranty theory. The supreme court affirmed, commenting:
[Wlhen the factual issue is not whether the product itself is
defective, but is whether the manufacturer has provided adequate warnings, the existence of a product defect and a breach
of duty is determined by the same standard-reasonable care
under the circumstances. .
. . . Consequently, when liability turns on the adequacy of
a warning, the issue is one of reasonable care, regardless of
whether the theory pled is negligence, implied warranty or
strict liability in tort?

..

60. Id. at 383, 549 P.2d at 1106.
61. Id. at 383-84,549 P.2d at 1107 (quoting 2 L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS
$ 16A[4][e] (1975)). See also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19
LIABILITY
S.W.L.J. 5 (1965).
62. 37 Colo. App. at 385-86, 549 P.2d at 1108 (brackets in original) (quoting Phillips
v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)).
63. 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979).
64. Id. at 89-90, 273 N.W.2d at 480.
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It has been held that the manufacturer's duty to warn the
medical profession extends beyond the prescribing p h y s i ~ i a n . ~ ~
In a case involving oral contraceptives, the Oregon Supreme
Court stated:
It is especially important that the treating doctor receive the
manufacturer's warning where it is impossible to predict in advance whether a particular patient is apt to suffer adverse effects from a drug, since the treating doctor may be more likely
to observe the actual symptoms of the drug's untoward
consequences. . . .
. The warning should be sufficient to apprise the general practitioner as well as the "unusually sophisticated medical man" of the dangerous propensities of the drug.66

..

B. The Polio Cases and the Duty to Warn
Several recent cases involving polio vaccines have further
delineated the drug manufacturer's duty to warn, and in so doing have greatly alarmed the drug industry. The original polio
vaccine was the Salk vaccine (dead virus). Later the Sabin oral
vaccine was developed, as types I, 11, and 111. The Sabin vaccine
was licensed by the Division of Biologic Standards (DBS), which
was then a part of HEW. In 1960 an advisory committee was
established by the Surgeon General to review polio prevention.
After a showing of some association between the type I11 Sabin
polio vaccine and the development of polio in adults, the advisory committee recommended in 1962 that the vaccine's use be
limited to children in nonepidemic situations. The committee
further recommended that the type I11 vaccine only be used for
adults with the full recognition of its minuscule risk (estimated
to be about 7.6 per million for persons over twenty years of age).
The manufacturers sold their vaccines to mass immunization
clinics that were often established with the assistance of drug
salesmen. In most instances, no warnings were given, and doctors did not individually evaluate a person's need for the drug.
~ ' plaintiff conIn Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, I ~ C . , the
tracted polio thirty days after receiving a type I11 Sabin vaccine
65. See Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 1973); McEwen v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 387-88, 528 P.2d 522, 528 (1974).
66. McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. at 387-88, 528 P.2d at 529; see
Mahr v. G. D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540,561-62,390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229-30 (1979).
67. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Co.,
451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970) (on causation and failure to warn in oral polio vaccine injury).

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

80

[I980

in a Montana clinic. A pharmacist had been delegated the task
of administering the vaccine in the absence of a doctor. The
court considered the manufacturer's alleged failure to warn the
plaintiff of the risk as sufficient to expose it to strict liability in
tort. Since the vaccine presented a known risk that could not be
narrowly defined, it could be properly marketed only by "full
disclosure of the existence and extent of the risk in~olved.""~
The court observed that the risk of the plaintiff contracting polio from the wild virus was about the same as the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine. Even though Wyeth had technically warned the medical society, it failed in its responsibility
since it knew that the drug was not dispensed as a "prescription
drug" and that the warnings were not reaching the consumer.
The court suggested means of communication the manufacturer
could have undertaken, such as advertisements, posters, oral
warnings, or releases to be read and signed by recipients of the
vaccine.
an eight month-old child
In Reyes u. Wyeth Laboratorie~,"~
given trivalent vaccine at a health clinic in a rural Texas community developed polio. The mother had been given no warnings
by the registered nurse who administered the vaccine. Although
the defendant contended that there was an epidemic of wild polio in the county at the time the child became ill, and that Samples of the virus taken from the child upon admission to the hospital were "probably wild,"70 the jury found that the vaccine
caused the child's polio. The court established two tests whereby
a manufacturer would be liable: (1)whether the product was so
unsafe that its marketing alone was "unreasonably dangerous
per se," or (2) whether the product was marketed without sufficient safeguards and was therefore "unreasonably dangerous as
marketed."71 Because of the legitimate public interest in
preventing polio, marketing the vaccine was held to be justified.
However, under the circumstances of the vaccine's administration, where no individualized medical judgment intervened between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer, the manufacturer was "required to warn the ultimate consumer, or to see
that he [was] warned."7a The court postulated a rebuttable pre68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

399 F.2d at 129.
498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.1096 (1974).
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1276.
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sumption "that the consumer would have read any warning provided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the
The fifteen year old patient in Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co.?' was given the type I Sabin vaccine in a Tulsa,
Oklahoma clinic and subsequently developed polio. The defendant claimed there was no evidence that the plaintiff would have
refused to take the vaccine had the warnings been given to him
or to his parents. The court held that the plaintiff was not required to present any direct evidence on this point and was entitled to a rebuttable presumption. In view of the fact that there
was considerable risk of contracting polio from natural sources
at the time the vaccine was given (twelve cases of polio occurred
in Tulsa during October and November 1962, two months before
the plaintiffs inoculation), the court concluded that the issue of
whether the plaintiff as a reasonably prudent person would have
refused to take the vaccine had adequate warning been given
was for the jury.
In Givens v. Lederle,76 the plaintiffs young daughter was
given an oral vaccine by her pediatrician. The mother, who had
never received a polio vaccination of any kind, developed polio
within nine days of her daughter's ingestion of the third dose of
vaccine. On the insert packaged with the vaccine, the defendant
Lederle had stated that:

. .

.

Para1yti.c disease . has been reported . ., in some instances, in persons who were in close contact with subjects who
had been given live oral polio virus vaccine. Fortunately, such
occurrences are rare, and it could not be definitely established
that any such case was due to the vaccine strain and was not
coincidental with infection due to naturally occurring poliomyelitis, or other entroviruse~.~~

Mrs. Givens had received no warnings from her pediatrician. At
the first trial, the judge had kept the jury from hearing evidence
on the issue of whether oral vaccine can cause polio. After the
Reyes decision, the court reversed itself and granted the plaintiffs motion for a new trial. In turn relying upon Reyes, the reviewing court upheld the lower court's action, and stated that in
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1281.
532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974).
556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1343.
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Reyes it was not a significant factual distinction that the vaccine
had actually been ingested by the plaintiff, because the defendant's "warning" admitted that some persons in close contact
with vaccinees had developed paralytic diseases. The only issue
was whether polio could be transmitted to someone in close contact. Testimony showed that a mother changing her baby's
diapers would be particularly susceptible to contracting the disease. In addition, because administration of the vaccine by a private pediatrician rather than personnel in a county health clinic,
was not "nearly so great" a difference as the defendant had argued it to be, the manufacturer's duty to warn the patient extended to this situation. The doctor testified that the vaccine
had been administered in a manner more similar to procedures
followed at a small health clinic than to normal procedures used
in prescribing drugs. If this was true, then the defendant was
responsible for taking definite steps to warn the consumer directly. Even if the drug were considered a prescription drug, the
court found that the enclosed warning did not adequately state
the risk. The doctor testified that the manner of stating the one
in three million risk was a "very nebulous way of putting it."77
Thus, the drug manufacturers' duty to warn has been extended beyond the prescribing physician to the entire medical
community. How this warning is to be communicated to doctors
specializing in different areas of medicine is not clear. Furthermore, in the absence of a learned intermediary, the warning
must be given to the patient himself, and sometimes even to a
third party. In Givens a close relative was allegedly harmed, but
the court did not limit its holding to close relatives. Therefore,
the scope of the duty owed third persons remains unclear. It is
also unclear how a proper warning is to be drafted when a manufacturer possesses incomplete information, but has some suspicion, based on a statistically small sample of reported cases, that
its drug may cause adverse side effects.
The fact that the drug package insert has been approved by
the FDA does not relieve the drug manufacturer of its obligation
to communicate an adequate warning to the users of the drug.78
An Oregon case7@indicating that a drug complying with FDA
regulations was reasonably safe as a matter of law has been ex77. Id. at 1345.
78. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978).
79. Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966).
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pressly overruled.80The warnings required by such agencies may
be only minimal,sl and therefore do not provide an adequate
standard by which to measure a manufacturer's duty.

C. The DES Cases and the Problem of Proving Causation
There are other uncertainties peculiar to drug litigation. Because of the lengthy time interval between ingestion of a drug
and manifestation of the injury, and the even longer period between the injury and the identification of the drug as its probable cause, a plaintiff may have difficulty in identifying the drug's
manufacturer. Nowhere is this problem evidenced more clearly
than in the current DES l i t i g a t i ~ n ? ~
In 1941 the FDA approved DES after twelve drug companies filed new drug applications. In support of their request
the companies submitted a joint clinical file. The purpose for
which the drug was approved in 1941 did not include its subsequent and popular use for the prevention of miscarriages. In
1947 new applications for that use were submitted by the twelve
companies and others, and from 1947 to 1971 the drug was manufactured by hundreds of drug companies and prescribed for
millions of women. In 1971 statistical evidence indicated a significant association between DES and the development of cancer
in the users' daughter^:^ who had been exposed in utero. The
FDA banned the drug in 1971 as unsafe and ineffective in
preventing miscarriage^.^' Although there were several hundred
manufacturers of DES and related drugs, it was estimated that
Eli Lilly and five or six other manufacturers accounted for 90%
80. See McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 398,528 P.2d 522,534
(1974).
81. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke-Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); Stevens v.
Parke-Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973). See also 21
U.S.C. 5 355 (e)(l) (1976) (approval of new drug application may be withdrawn if clinical
or other experience, tests or other scientific data show the drug to be unsafe); 21 C.F.R. 5
310.300 (1979) (requires a manufacturer holding an approved new drug application to
maintain records so that the FDA can determine whether there are grounds for suspension or withdrawal); 21 U.S.C. 5 352(a) (1976) (a drug or devise is misbranded if its
labeling is false or misleading in any way).
82. DES is the acronym for diethylstilbestrol, a manmade estrogen. For a full discussion of the problems faced by plaintiffs in DES actions, see Note, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV.963 (1978).
83. In addition, a possible decrease in fertility has been noted in users' sons.
84. The 1962 Amendment to the Food, Drug qnd Cosmetic Act required proof of
effectiveness as well as safety. 21 U.S.C. 5 355 (1976).

84

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

of the market.8Wevertheless, it was extremely unlikely that any
plaintiff would be able to trace back the particular DES taken
by her mother to any one individual manufacturer.
Prior tort cases provided some guidelines for the DES plaintiffs. Hall u. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & C O .consolidated
~~
two
cases arising out of eighteen separate accidents in which children were injured by dynamite blasting caps. The explosions destroyed the evidence of manufacture in most cases. The plaintiffs joined the six major domestic manufacturers of blasting
caps and their trade association, alleging that the defendants
knew that the caps were dangerous and that they had agreed not
to put warnings on them." The court held that the defendants
were not entitled to a dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims since the
plaintiffs were claiming joint control of risk by explicit agreement-i.e., concert of action.88 The court went on to add that
the plaintiffs could either "submit evidence of defendants' parallel behavior sufficient to support an inference of tacit agreement,"89 or allege that, acting independently, the defendants
had adhered to an industry-wide standard with regard to the
safety of blasting caps? The court discussed enterprise liability
and emphasized its special applicability to industries composed
of a "small number of units."91 The burden of proving causation
was shifted to the defendant? despite the possibility that the
caps might have come from other unnamed sources.
Another approach for DES plaintiffs is the "alternative liability theory." In Summers v. Tice,*" the plaintiffs two companions fired their guns simultaneously and carelessly in his direction. Only one bullet actually hit the plaintiff, but it was
impossible to prove which defendant had caused the injury. The
court justified its concept of joint and several liability on the
grounds that when all the defendants are potential wrongdoers,
fairness requires a finding of joint liability unless the defendants
can individually exonerate themselves.
85. B. SEAMAN,
WOMEN
AND THE CRISIS
IN SEXHORMONES
33 (1977).
86. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
87. Id. at 359.
88. Id. at 373-74.
89. Id. at 374.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 378.
92. Id. at 378-80.
93. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See also Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486,
154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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In the related case of Anderson v. Somberg,@*the plaintiff
was injured when part of a surgical instrument broke off in his
spinal canal during an operation. He sued the doctor and hospital for negligence, the distributor for breach of warranty, and
the instrument's manufacturer in strict liability. The court held
that because it was apparent that at least one of the defendants
was liable for the plaintiffs injury, all were jointly liable unless
proven otherwise. No other theory of liability could reasonably
be applied. "Since defendants had engaged in conduct which activated legal obligations by each of them to plaintiff, . . . the
failure of any defendant to prove his nonculpability would trigger liability; and further, . . a t least one would be liable.""
Plaintiffs have recently used analogous arguments-with varying degrees of success-jn attempting to trace liability back to
the DES manufacturers. In McCreery u. Eli Lilly & C O . ; ~the
court refused to accept the "sketchy and limited factual circumstances presented in [the plaintiffs] argument of concerted activity," and held that the plaintiff must, "before benefiting from
the shift of the evidentiary burden, identify the manufacutre"r.@'
Since knowledge of the manufacturer was more accessible to the plaintiff (whose mother had known of and possessed
the prescription, and had chosen the doctor and druggist), the
court affirmed the summary judgment for the defendant. A contrary result was reached in Sindell u. Abbott Laboratories,B8
where the plaintiffs alleged concerted action and theories of alternative liability. And in the much publicized New York case of
Bichler u. Eli Lilly & Co.,@@
a jury awarded $500,000 to a twentyfive year old woman who developed vaginal and cervical cancer
as a result of her mother's ingestion of DES. There the plaintiff
alleged joint enterprise liability. This approach, if successful on
appeal, is sure to have a major impact on the more than 400
DES suits still pending.

.

D. Application of Statutes of Limitation
Since a plaintiff in a drug liability action may plead a variety of legal theories-e.g., negligence, warranty, strict liability in
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
67 N.J. at 298, 338 A.2d at 4.
87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978).
Id. at 84-85, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978).
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1979, 5 3, at 11, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 1979).
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tort-it is necessary at the outset to determine which statute of
limitations period applies to each cause of action pleaded. Typically, the tort or personal injury limitation is two or three years
and accrues at the time of injury. The warranty limitation under
the Uniform Commercial Code is four yearslOOand accrues from
the date the sales contract is breached. It is, of course, entirely
possible that the limitation period for one cause of action will
have expired while that of another remains viable.lol
A second and far more complicated question is when the
cause of action accrues. The Uniform Commercial Code provides
that the "action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach
of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made . . . .,,lo2
Nonetheless, there are at least four points at which a tort cause
of action may accrue: (1)when the defendant breaches his duty,
(2) when the plaintiff suffers harm, (3) when the plaintiff is or
should be aware of his injury, or (4) when the plaintiff is or
should be aware of the causal relationship between his harm and
the defendant's misconduct. In most tort actions these events
occur simultaneously and the time of accrual is clear. But this is
seldom the case in drug induced injuries. It is impossible to generalize the law regarding statutory interpretation insofar as it affects drug litigation,loSexcept to point out that it is in a state of
flux.
Some jurisdictions, led by New York, have adopted the
strict position that the cause of action accrues when there is a
wrongful invasion of personal or property rights,lo4regardless of
whether the plaintiff realizes he has been injured. Most lower
courts in New York have persisted in this "first breath" rule,lo5
despite a more liberal approach to malpractice claims that in100. U.C.C. § 2-725.
101. See Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974), in which
the court held that the two-year period for strict liability in tort had elapsed while the
four-year statutory period for implied warranty had not.
102. U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
103. See Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products
279 (1977); Note, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise
Liability Cases, 13 FORUM
L. REV. 963, 970 n.23; Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965).
Liability, 46 FORDHAM
104. See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d
142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, amended, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896,
cert. denied, 374 US. 808 (1963).
105. So-called because the Schwartz plaintips injury for inhalation of dust accrued
with his "first breath." See, e.g., Reis v. Pfizer, Inc., 61 App. Div. 2d 777, 402 N.Y.S. 2d
401 (1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 664, 397 N.E.2d 390, 421 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1979).
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volve the leaving of a foreign object in a patient's body-for
which the statute does not begin to run until the patient could
reasonably have discovered the injury106-and despite the more
liberal tolling of the statute by the continued treatment by the
physician.lo7Recently, exceptions to these rules have been made
in products liability cases brought for occupational disease in
strict tort liability.lo8It has also been held that the continuous
treatment of an attending physician may be imputed to the
manufacturer of a medical device, thus tolling the statutory period applicable to claims against the m a n u f a ~ t u r e r . ~ ~ ~
Other jurisdictions have adopted the liberal discovery of injury rule. Yet even with these jurisdictions generalizations are
dangerous. Clearly, the plaintiff may learn of his injury many
years before he is able to identify its cause. Some courts have
held that the statute begins to run at the time the plaintiff knew
or should have known of his injury. Knowledge of injury is only
apparent if the injury is a "traumatic" one.l1° However, if the
plaintiff has not been made aware that his rights were violated,
the modern trend and majority position in products liability actions is that the plaintiffs action accrues when he discovers, or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, that his
injury may have been caused by the defendant's conduct,ll1
rather than when he simply discovers that he has been injured.
On the issue of fairness to the drug companies, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has observed:
With respect to their expectations of repose, drug companies
are unique among most potential tortfeasors. The harmful
propensities of drugs are often not fully known at the time the
drugs are marketed. These companies know or a t least should
expect that some time may pass before the harmful effects of
106. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871,
301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
107. See N.Y. CN. PRAC.
LAW§ 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
108. See, e.g., McKee v. Johns Manville Corp., 94 Misc. 2d 327, 404 N.Y.S.2d 814
(Sup. Ct. 1978).
109. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
110. Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974). But see
Roper v. Merkle, 59 Ill. App. 3d 706, 375 N.E.2d 934 (1978). In this case Berry was
restricted to traumatic injuries. In addition, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice cases was held to begin to run when the plaintiff knows that he has a physical
injury and that it may be the result of someone's negligence.
111. See G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22,122 Cal. Rptr. 218
(1975); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Gilbert v. Jones,
523 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
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their products manifest themselves in drug users and that
there may be another lapse of time before the injured person is
able to discover the causal connection between his injury and
the drug he consumed. . . . Given these unique circumstances
and the fact that the scope of a drug manufacturer's liability is
substantial and seems to expand continually through the
growth of substantive tort and warranty doctrines, . . . we do
not think the drug company can reasonably expect to be immune to suit before its customer has a fair opportunity to discover the company's tortious conduct.lle

E. The Recent DES Case of Mink v. University of Chicago
A recent case, Mink v. University of Chicago,l13posed many
of the issues discussed in this article. There the plaintiffs
brought a diversity action on behalf of themselves and some
1,000 women who were given DES as part of an experimental
study allegedly conducted by the named defendant and Eli Lilly
& Co. They claimed that they and their children had suffered
reproductive tract abnormalities and had incurred an increased
risk of cancer. In their complaint they sought recovery on three
causes of action. They first alleged battery, since the medical experiment was conducted without their knowledge or consent.
The court distinguished this case from those in which the patients at least knew that they were being given some form of a
drug."' In those cases negligent failure to disclose risks had to
be pleaded and proved, and injury had to be alleged. The gist of
the battery claim was nonconsent-the tort being complete
without hostile intent, and without personal injury. The issue of
whether implied consent had been given was left to the jury.
The second count was in strict liability and was dismissed because the named plaintiffs had alleged no injury to themselves.
In their amended complaint they sought damages for alleged injury to other class members, but this was held to be an insufficient allegation of injury to the named plaintiffs.ll5 The third
claim was that no effort had been made to notify the plaintiffs of
their participation in the experiment until 1975 or 1976, even
112. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. at 173-74, 371 A.2d at 176 (citations
omitted).
113. 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
114. Id. at 717.
115. 460 F. Supp. at 722-23 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26 (1976)).
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though the relationship between DES and cancer was known to
the medical community as early as 1971. The court recognized a
continuing duty to warn on the part of both the university and
the drug manufacturer,l16 but dismissed this count for failure to
state a cause of action. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs
sought to compel the defendants to notify all the women given
DES as part of the experiment. Since the plaintiffs' proposed
class had never been certified, and since the named plaintiffs already were aware of the DES menace, the plaintiffs could not
show that there was an ongoing controversy at the time the complaint was filed. The named plaintiffs knew of the dangers and
thus had no need for further notice.l17
The concerns of the manufacturers and their insurers therefore appear more understandable in the context of recent developments in drug litigation. Despite the articulated concerns of
Congress, it seems inevitable that future mass inoculation programs will involve an attempt to have the government underwrite the costs of liability. For this reason it is important to refer to the Federal Torts Claims Ad, and particularly to the
"discretionary act" exception,l18 which has so often been invoked by the government in avoiding liability.

Two cases are particularly relevant in considering governmental liability for drug approval and distribution. In Griffinv.
United States,ll@the plaintiff allegedly contracted polio as a result of ingesting the type I11 Sabin vaccine. She brought an action against the government claiming that the vaccine had been
negligently tested by the Division of Biologic Standards (DBS)
and had been approved for release in violation of agency standards. Since the application and not the content of the agency
rules was attacked, the court held that the discretionary function exception did not apply. The court commented:
"The "discretion" protected by the section is not that of the
judge-a power to decide within the limits of positive rules of
law subject to judicial review. It is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 720.
Id. at 723.
28 U.S.C. 5 2680(a) (1976).
500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
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the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in
American law. . . . Where there is room for policy judgment
and decision, there is discretion."laO

While DBS had the right to weigh five criteria of neurovirulence,
its judgment was that of a professional, not a policy maker. I t
was purely a scientific determination since DBS's responsibility
was limited to merely executing the policy judgments of the Surgeon General. Furthermore, in approving this lot of vaccine,
DBS had exceeded its authority by disregarding the mandatory
regulatory command and had diluted the results of the tests performed by considering "biological variation." "The violation of a
nondiscretionary command takes what otherwise might be characterized as a 'discretionary function' outside the scope of the
statutory exception."lal
However, in Gray v. United States12' the plaintiff was unsuccessful in her suit. She alleged that she had been injured
when her mother ingested DES and sued both Eli Lilly and the
federal government, relying on Griffin as precedent. Summary
judgment was granted both defendants. The court commented
that "[tlhe FDA was given a general statutory mandate to assure
the public that a marketed drug [was] safe for use."12s There
were no particular scientific tests or measuring sticks existing
whereby the FDA had to qualify a new drug, but rather it was
given the liberty to consider all factors it deemed relevant in the
determination of a drug's safety. "Congress [had] chosen the
FDA to be the decision maker, . . . and its judgments . . . must
be beyond private scrutiny and litigation."la4

IV. CONCLUSION
Thus, a clear message emerges: in any future mass inoculation program, agency action must be "nondiscretionary" if the
federal government is to be held liable. To the extent possible,
specific "measuring sticks" or tests should be specified. In view
of the strict liability claim frequently made in drug litigation, it
is likely that the government will be forced to concede liability
120. Id. at 1064 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 34-36 (1953)).
121. Id. at 1068-69.
122. 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
123. Id. at 340.
124. Id.

,
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on that ground despite the present limitation on liabilit~."~
It is
clear that the government must develop clear guidelines for protecting participants in the mass immunization programs it
deems necessary. In the absence of such protection, we may expect continued resistance from drug manufacturers, health care
providers, and their insurers to any participation in such
programs.

125. See Laird v. Nelms, 406

U.S.797

(1972).

